2012年7月18日星期三

Richard N. Haass: Into Syria without Arms



NEW YORK – Much of the debate over what to do in the Middle East tends to pit realists against idealists. Bahrain is a classic case, as is Saudi Arabia and, for that matter, Egypt: calls for the United States and other countries with interests and influence in the region to stand up for democracy and human rights run up against concerns that national-security interests will suffer if pro-Western authoritarian regimes are ousted. European and US policymakers often attempt to square the circle with a compromise policy that is inconsistent and satisfies no one.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad stands next to Syrian defence minister general Dawoud Rajha, right, in October 2011. Rajha was reported to have been killed in an attack today.

Syria offers a stark contrast to this pattern in the sense that strategic and humanitarian interests are aligned. Many governments have a strategic desire to oust a regime that is closely allied with Iran and Hezbollah. And there is a humanitarian desire to get rid of a regime that has killed as many as 15,000 – if not more – of its own people.

But an armed intervention would be a large undertaking, one requiring not just considerable air power (given Syria’s extensive air-defense network) but also ground forces, given the existence of at least two capable divisions that remain loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. The sectarian nature of Syrian society all but guarantees that the presence of troops from other countries would be both prolonged and difficult.

One alternative to direct military intervention is to provide arms and other forms of support to the opposition. This is being done. The case for helping people defend themselves is obvious. But arming the opposition is not without its drawbacks. It risks fueling a civil war and encouraging regime loyalists to dig in. In addition, arms provided to fight the regime will be used by factions to fight one another if and when the regime is removed, thereby making the aftermath in Syria that much more violent.

But intervention need not be defined as either armed intervention or intervention with arms. There is much more that the world can and should be doing to bring about the removal of the Assad regime.
For starters, economic sanctions can be increased. The rule of thumb should be that Syria will be the target of sanctions no less stringent than those being applied to Iran. Syria’s energy and banking sectors should be fully covered.

The elites in Syria who still support the regime ought to pay an additional price. Cutting off air travel to and from Syria would increase dissatisfaction among those who regularly visit London, Paris, and other Western capitals.

Likewise, those Arab governments unhappy with the state of affairs in Syria can do more to bring about change. They could suspend all ties with Syria, and they should scale back commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia, the regime’s most important external backer, until the Kremlin alters its policy.

Moreover, the diplomatic mission led by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan under UN auspices needs to be fundamentally recast. The time to try to broker a compromise, with Assad’s regime agreeing to reforms that would satisfy the opposition, is long gone (if it ever existed). The purpose of diplomacy now should be to bring about an exit for Assad and his inner circle, and to establish a process for moving to a new, more representative political order based on the rule of law.

We are already beginning to see some of those closest to Assad desert what they rightly view as a sinking ship. One way to accelerate this trend is to threaten war-crimes indictments by a certain date, say, August 15, for any senior official who remains a part of the government and is associated with its campaign against the Syrian people. Naming these individuals would concentrate minds in Damascus.

Defections will also increase if the Syrian opposition demonstrates that the alternative to the Assad regime is one that is truly open and inclusive. The minority Alawites fear that they will suffer the fate of the minority Sunnis in post-Saddam Iraq. The only way to reassure them (and to encourage them to defect) is with an opposition that becomes truly national and articulates principles that appeal to all Syrians. Western governments need to work much more closely with the divided and relatively inexperienced opposition if this imperative is to be met.
In short, the crisis in Syria warrants outside intervention, but mostly with tools other than arms. What is needed is an approach that hastens the demise of the Assad regime and increases the odds that what comes after will not be an orgy of vengeance, violence, and chaos. The human and strategic stakes call for no less.


Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2003, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bush’s special envoy to Northern Ireland and Pakistan, before resigning from the Bush administration in protest against the Iraq war. He was also Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council under President George H.W. Bush.


Leading Syrian regime figures killed in Damascus bomb attack

Rebels kill Bashar al-Assad's brother-in-law, defence minister and other key figures in Damascus

Assef Shawkat, brother-in-law of the Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, who has been killed by a rebel bomb in Damascus

Syria's uprising has entered a dramatic new phase as rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad killed three of his top security chiefs in a devastating bomb attack in the heart of Damascus.

Syrian state TV confirmed the death of Assef Shawkat, Assad's brother-in-law and the deputy head of the armed forces, and his closest security adviser, as well as Dawoud Rajha, the minister of defence and the regime's most senior Christian figure. Hassan Turkmani, its crisis management chief, was also killed.

Several other key figures, including the interior minister, Mohammed Shaar, were wounded and being treated in the capital's al-Shami hospital.

Explosions were also reported from the headquarters of the army's 4th division in Damascus – the regime's elite unit commanded by Assad's brother Maher.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, said a "decisive battle" had begun in Syria. Lavrov also made clear Moscow would oppose a draft UN security council resolution threatening punishment if Assad did not implement the UN-backed peace plan promoted by Kofi Annan.
The attack on the headquarters of Syria's national security council in the al-Rawda area was the most audacious yet by anti-Assad rebels, who have been fighting sporadically in parts of the capital for the past four days.

It was not clear whether it was a suicide bombing but it was rumoured that the suspected killer may have been a bodyguard for Rajha or another member of Assad's inner circle. But one pro-regime source in Damascus told the Guardian it was possible that a bomb could have planted on the premises.

The attack was a deadly blow to the heart of the regime after two recent high-level defections – by a senior Republican Guard commander and Syria's ambassador to Iraq.

Syrian state TV said foreign-backed "terrorists" had carried out the attack. The country's armed forces said in a statement that Syria was "more determined than ever to confront all forms of terrorism and chop off any hand that harms national security".

Syrian state TV also reported that the military would on Thursday morning call up its reserve forces. Replacements for the three dead men were quickly announced.

Rumours spread wildly in the hours after the incident and information was impossible to verify. According to one pro-government source rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) started moving around in pick-up trucks to show they controlled parts of the city. Ba'ath party members had been executed by FSA men, the source said.

There were also widespread reports of defections in many areas of Syria including central Damascus as well as Homs and Hama. Activists reported that several tanks had been abandoned near the centre of the capital and that several combat units had defected en masse. These reports could not be independently confirmed.

Shawkat, married to Assad's sister Bushra, was one of the most feared figures in the president's inner circle and had won the support of the clan's influential matriarch, Anisa. He was one of three central figures in the regime crackdown, along with Assad himself and his brother Maher. As Syria's overall security chief, he had key input into all military and intelligence operations. He is known to have survived an attempt to poison him in late May when a cook contaminated food that had been prepared for him and key members of the national security ministry.

Abu Hamza of the Free Syrian Army told the Guardian at the time that rebel forces were trying to recruit aides of regime figures to carry out future attacks. "We have had some success with this," he said. "Some have been with us for a long time and have not yet been given orders to move."

Shawkat had also been a key point-man with Iran and with Hezbollah. Since the uprising started he had chaired key strategy meetings and had driven the regime's uncompromising and aggressive military response to the escalating dissent.

Rajha, a former general, was appointed defence minister last year in an apparent attempt to emphasise the inclusiveness of the Alawite-dominated regime.

Prospects for any kind of negotiation between the government and rebels – always slim – have now disappeared.

Pro-regime Syrians appeared shocked by the news. "A lot of pro-Assad people are really panicking," said an opposition activist. "Now they sound really nervous."

Assad supporters admitted the attack was a serious blow. "This will not be the end of the regime in any way," said one member of Assad's Alawite community. "But it is serious and people are traumatised at the fact that the opposition managed to assassinate these people. But government supporters want the government to be firm and show it is still in control. The Syrian government is not usually impulsive."