BERLIN – The
multipolar nature of today’s international system will again be on display at
the upcoming G-20 summit in Los Cabos, Mexico.
Global problems are no longer solved, crises managed, or global rules defined,
let alone implemented, the old-fashioned way, by a few, mostly Western, powers.
Incipient great and middle powers, such as India,
Brazil, Indonesia,
South Korea, Turkey,
and South Africa,
also demand their say.
Some of these powers are still emerging economies. Politically, however,
most of them have crossed the threshold that has long limited their access to
the kitchen of international decision-making. The five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council (the “P-5”) still defend their right to veto
resolutions, and their military power is unmatched. But they can no longer
dispose of sufficient resources, competence, and legitimacy to cope with global
challenges or crises on their own.Bipolarity is a thing of the past, and it is unlikely to re-emerge in a new Sino-American “G-2.” It is equally unlikely for the foreseeable future that any one club of countries, such as the G-7 or G-8, will again assume a quasi-hegemonic position. Even the G-20 in its current composition may not really represent the forces that can and will shape the twenty-first century.
For the Unites States, the European Union, Japan, and other members of the “Old West,” the good news is that most of the emerging powers that are positioning themselves for a more active global role are also democracies. Within the G-20, only two states – China and Saudi Arabia – explicitly do not want to be liberal democracies, while a third, Russia, has developed into an autocracy with a democratic façade.
The not-so-good news is that these new democratic powers do not necessarily share the Old West’s political agenda. For example, they differ about climate policies, seeing a threat to development. Similarly, while new middle and great powers do not always agree, they are generally more skeptical of both international sanctions and military interventions.
Moreover, some of the most important of these states differ substantially with the US, and often also with the EU, about the right approach toward regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East. Thus, in 2010, the US found itself in a serious diplomatic dispute with Turkey and Brazil about how to resolve the conflict with Iran over its nuclear program. Without actually admitting it, the US was clearly unhappy that these two states tried to play a diplomatic role of their own in the dispute.
Differences are also apparent where new democratic middle or great powers have formed new groups or clubs, such as the BRICS, together with non-democratic powers. India, Brazil, and South Africa are using such formats in a pragmatic way to pursue their interests, or simply to demonstrate their increased international weight. There is little agreement between them and Russia or China – both P-5 members – with regard to political values or to fundamental questions of international order.
Along with many other states in the global South, however, Russia and China tend to defend the principle of non-interference, and they are generally reluctant to support any US or European attempts to project democracy or defend human rights in other countries.
Not a few policymakers in the US and in Europe have reacted with astonishment, or even annoyance, to these emerging democratic powers’ attempts to pursue their own agendas on the world stage. Such reactions partly reflect old thinking rooted in the Cold War, when democratic countries might differ over details, but would agree about the main questions of international politics. Those who pursued a different agenda on substantial matters were either not part of the “democratic camp” or were not important international players.
By contrast, a central feature of today’s globalized, multipolar world is that shared democratic values do not guarantee agreement about substantial questions of international politics. The more democracies there are, the more conflicts of interests and differences are likely to emerge between democratic countries.
There is little reason to react with anger when states like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa set priorities different from those of Europe or the US, or have different views about how to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, development aid, democracy promotion, or environmental protection. The US example shows clearly that democratic great powers often pursue their interests with little regard for a global common good that others have defined.
In other words, the international order is becoming more pluralistic. The task for established Western democracies is to accept and cope with such “democratic differences” on the international level, and to seek multilateral coalitions to manage or solve problems.
In principle, the EU is better positioned than the US (and certainly than China) to take on this task. Europeans are well practiced in dealing with differences and shaping consensus among principally like-minded states. That said, Europe needs to learn to be clearer and more transparent about the interests underlying its own policies, rather than suggesting that its positions on a specific subject represent the only rational implementation of democratic values and norms.
Volker Perthes is Chairman and Director of Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin.
民主國家間的碰撞
柏林— 當今國際制度的多極性質將在即將到來的墨西哥洛斯卡沃斯G20峰會上再次顯現。全球問題的解決、危機的治理、全球規則的制定（更不用說執行了）由一小撮強國（絕大部分是西方國家）決定的日子已經一去不復返了。崛起的大國和中等國家，比如印度、巴西、印尼、韓國、土耳其和南非，無不要求獲得話語權。
這些強國中不乏新興經濟體。但是，從政治上說，這些國家絕大部分已經跨越了長期橫亙在它們面前、阻撓它們進入國際決策層的門檻。聯合國安理會五大常任理事國（“五常”）仍保有否決權，它們在軍力上的優勢也依然不容撼動。但它們已不再能夠隨心所欲地動用充分的資源、能力和哈發行來按自己的路子應對全球性挑戰和危機了。
兩極時代早已過去，新的中美“G2”復現隻是一個傳說。同樣，在可以預見的未來，形成由一組國家——比如G7和G8——佔據准霸權的局面也是不可能的。從現有組成情況看，即使是G20也不能真正代表能夠也將決定21世紀地球的力量。
對美國、歐盟、日本和其他“舊西方”成員來說，好消息是大部分追求更活躍全球角色的新興強國同樣也是民主國家。在G20中，隻有中國和沙特兩個國家明確不希望走自由民主道路，而俄羅斯實行的是獨裁為體、民主為表。
不太妙的消息是這些新的民主強國並不與舊西方政治日程天然相容。比如，它們實施著不同的氣候政策，這給發展蒙上了一層陰影。類似地，盡管新興中型和大型強國未必同意，但它們從總體上說對國際制裁和軍事干預持懷疑態度。
此外，這些國家中最重要者與美國（通常與歐洲也是這樣）在關於地區沖突（特別是中東地區）的正確解決之道的問題上存在重大分歧。因此，2010年，在研究怎樣化解伊朗核計劃導致的沖突時，美國與土耳其和巴西出現了嚴重的外交爭論。美國雖然沒有明說，但顯然對土巴兩國試圖在爭論中扮演獨立角色的做法很不滿。
在新興中型和大型民主強國與非民主強國形成新集團（如金磚國家）的領域，分歧也顯而易見。印度、巴西和南非採取了實用主義，利用這種方式追求自己的利益或用以表明自己日益增加的國際分量。在政治價值和國際秩序的基本問題等方面，它們與俄羅斯和中國（均在五常之列）並無多少共同語言。
但是，俄羅斯和中國與眾多南方國家一道捍衛著不干涉的原則，一般而言，它們對任何美國或歐洲在別國推進民主、捍衛人權的行動都不支持。
不少美國和歐洲政客對這些新興民主強國在國際舞台上追求自身利益感到驚訝甚至有些惱怒。這樣的反應部分體現了植根於冷戰的舊思維——民主國家盡管在細節上可能存在分歧，但在國際政治的主要問題上保持一致。在本質性問題上追求不同利益者要麼不屬於“民主陣營”，要麼地位無關緊要。
相反，當今全球化、多極化世界的一大核心特征是共同的民主價值並不能保証國際政治本質問題上的一致性。民主國家越多，民主國家之間產生利益沖突和分歧的可能性就越大。
當土耳其、巴西和南非等國家的優先考慮項與歐洲或美國出現不同，或在如何處理阿拉伯-以色列沖突、伊朗、發展援助、促進民主以及環境保護等問題的觀點上出現分歧時，沒有必要反應過激。美國的例子清晰地表明，民主強國不顧其他國家眼中的全球共同利益一意孤行乃是家常便飯。
換句話說，國際秩序正在朝多元化發展。成熟的西方民主需要接受和處理好國際層面的這些“民主分歧”，尋求多邊聯盟治理和解決問題。
從原理上說，歐盟比美國更能承擔這一任務（比中國更能承擔是肯定的）。歐洲人在解決分歧、形成原則無甚差異的國家間的共識方面有著更豐富的經驗。歐洲需要學著更明確、更透明的表達自身政策背后的利益訴求，而不是聲稱自己在某個具體問題上代表著唯一的民主價值和范式的理性實施之道。