LISBON/RIGA – Is the Europe that is
emerging from the euro crisis a German one? During the euro crisis, power in
the European Union seems to have shifted towards national capitals in general,
and towards one national capital in particular: Berlin.
But, with Germany
introverted, France
downgraded, and Britain
semi-detached, the big story in
European foreign policy is that the time has come for the little guy who
thinks big.
In this Europe, the important moves are now sometimes
made in Stockholm or Warsaw,
not only in Berlin, Paris,
or London. And, with major
foreign-policy issues on Europe’s doorstep – whether in Egypt,
Belarus, or now
Syria – useful
European initiatives are to be welcomed, regardless of where they originate.Germany, in foreign policy as well as in economics, can exert decisive leadership in the EU – when it wants to. For example, together with Poland, it led the EU’s attempt to develop a coordinated approach to Russia, and it flexed its muscles on Serbia. But, on other issues – for example, Libya – Germany did not so much lead as use its newfound room for maneuver to follow its own preferences in the face of other EU members.
So the answer today to Henry Kissinger’s famous question about whom he should call when he wants to speak to Europe, is not necessarily “the German chancellor.” While Berlin is increasingly imposing its economic preferences on others in the eurozone, it is not prepared to use military force as a foreign-policy tool, as it demonstrated in the case of Libya.
Moreover, Germany, it seems, is becoming a “geo-economic power” driven by the needs of its export sector. By using economic means to pursue its foreign-policy ends, Germany is gradually turning its back on its European partners.
Meanwhile, as France experiences a loss of power relative to Germany on economic issues, it continues to play a decisive role in foreign policy. France led the Libya operation, and is doing much the same with attempts to impose stronger sanctions against Iran and provide support for the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire.
But France’s unilateral approach often antagonizes its European partners. For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy preempted a common European position on the Palestinian statehood bid at the UN in September. In other words, even when France leads, it does not always do so in a constructive way.
Apart from the decisive role that it played in Libya alongside France, Britain is becoming increasingly marginal in European foreign policymaking. Even before it vetoed a plan by eurozone countries to create a “fiscal union” at the European summit in December 2011, it was playing less of a leadership role than it traditionally has on key European foreign-policy issues.
Britain has continued to support EU enlargement, closer links with Turkey, and development in Africa, but it has not launched any creative initiatives to bring other member states along or change the terms of the EU debate. On other issues, such as engaging “strategic partners” – China and Russia in particular – the United Kingdom is often a follower as well.
As the “big three” increasingly pursue their own narrowly defined national interests, however, other EU member states are emerging as leaders in key foreign-policy fields. For example, Sweden – the 14th largest member state in terms of population, and eighth in terms of GDP – under the leadership of Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Foreign Minister Carl Bildt punches considerably above its weight. Last year, it increased annual aid to North Africa by SEK100 million (€11.1 million), proposed an EU mission to Tunisia just a week after the revolution to support democratic aspirations there, and was an early and strong backer of UN resolutions in support of the uprising in Libya.
Poland, too, is emerging as a foreign-policy leader. Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski have particularly taken the initiative on the EU’s strategy towards Russia, where Poland has largely overcome its differences with Germany and is now at the forefront of efforts to develop a genuinely comprehensive approach. Poland has also led on European defense (though it declined to take part in the military intervention in Libya). This reflects the strength of the Polish economy, which is expected to grow by more than 3% in 2012 – faster than almost anywhere else in the EU.
Germany might be getting all of the attention in this time of crisis, but the last year has been a reminder that Europe is most effective and influential when the small countries get involved and join forces with – and even lead – the big ones. For example, on Iran (with exceptions like Greece), Europeans have united around a clear policy and collective positions, such as an oil embargo.
So, Poland and Sweden: Europe needs your leadership. But that might not be enough in an EU with more than 500 million citizens. Other EU states need to follow their example in order to make European foreign policy truly effective and influential.
Vaira Vike-Freiberga is a former president of Latvia and
Antonio Vitorino is a former Portuguese EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs.
Vaira
Vike-Freiberga, Antonio Vitorino: 德國的歐洲？
裡斯本/裡加——歐元危機中的歐洲成了德國的歐洲？歐元危機期間，歐洲聯盟的力量似乎已經向主要國家首都轉移，尤其是柏林。但是，德國轉內，法國降級，英國半獨立，在歐洲外交政策的大故事Ａ是，讓小家伙有大作用的時候到了。
在歐洲，這一重要舉措不僅出現在柏林、巴黎或倫敦，現在也有時出現在斯德哥爾摩或華沙。 歐洲門檻上的重大外交政策問題 - 無論是在埃及，白俄羅斯，或現在的敘利亞
– 實用的歐洲倡議是受歡迎的，無論它們源於何方。
德國無論在外交政策還是在經濟上，都可以在歐盟中發揮決定性的領導地位。例如，它與波蘭一起，帶領歐盟試圖建立與俄羅斯的協調關系，並延伸向塞爾維亞。但是，在其他問題上，例如利比亞，德國沒有為了自身利益在其他歐盟成員面前太多地使用回旋的新余地。
所以，今天對於基辛格著名問題有關當他想與歐洲對話時該找誰的答案不必再是德國總理了。雖然柏林在歐元區不斷加強其經濟上對別國的影響，但它不准備使用武力作為外交政策工具，正如它在利比亞所做的那樣。
此外，德國似乎因其出口部門的需求驅動而成為一個“地緣經濟力量”。用其經濟手段來實現外交政策目的，德國正逐漸背向其歐洲伙伴。
與此同時，法國經歷了相對德國來說在經濟問題上權力的損失，它仍在外交政策上發揮決定性的作用。法國引導利比亞運作，並試圖對伊朗實施更嚴厲的制裁，正如其提供對聯合國在科特迪瓦的支持一樣。
但法國的單邊主義做法往往使其與歐洲伙伴敵對。例如，9月份，法國總統薩爾科齊在聯合國巴勒斯坦建國投票中搶佔了歐洲共同立場。換句話說，即使由法國來領導，它也並不總是用這樣建設性的方式.
除了與法國一起在利比亞發揮了決定性的作用，英國在歐洲外交決策中變得日益邊緣化。盡管之前，在2011年12月的歐盟首腦會議上它否決了一項由歐元區國家提出的創建“財政聯盟”計劃，它在歐洲關鍵外交政策上的影響與其以前的傳統領導地位相比正在逐漸減弱。
英國支持歐盟東擴，發展與土耳其更密切的聯系及對非洲的開發，但還沒有推出任何創造性的舉措，使其他成員國支持或改變歐盟爭論的條款。在其他問題上，如搞“戰略伙伴”——特別是對中國和俄羅斯——英國往往也是支持者。
“三巨頭”越來越追求自己狹隘的國家利益，而其他歐盟成員國正在成為重要外交政策領域的領導者。例如，瑞典——成員國中人口排列第14位，GDP第8位——在首相賴因費爾特和外交大臣卡爾·比爾特的領導下，其影響力遠遠大於其排位。去年，它對北非的年度支援增加了100萬克朗（11.1百萬歐元），突尼斯革命一周后，它提出派一個歐盟代表團以支持那裡的民主意願，也是聯合國有關支持利比亞起義決議的早期和強大的支持者。
波蘭，也逐漸成為外交政策的領導者。總理圖斯克和外長西科斯基尤其在歐盟對俄羅斯的戰略上採取主動，波蘭已經在很大程度上克服了與德國的分歧，現在正努力發展真誠廣泛的途徑。波蘭也領導了歐洲防務（盡管它拒絕參加在利比亞的軍事干預）。這反映了波蘭經濟的實力，預計在2012年增幅將超過3％ - 比歐盟別的大部分國家更快。
德國可能在危機時刻得到更多的注意，但去年的情況証實，當小國同大國一起參與、甚至是領導時，歐盟會產生最大的效力和影響力。例如，對伊朗（希臘除外），歐洲各國都共有一個明確的政策和一致的立場，如石油禁運。
因此，波蘭和瑞典：歐洲需要你們的領導。但在一個擁有500多萬公民的歐盟來說這是遠遠不夠的。歐盟其他成員國需要以他們為榜樣，使歐洲的外交政策有真正的效力和有影響力。