Luke Harding: Russia's presidential election: Q&A with Luke Harding

The Guardian's former Russia correspondent answers your questions from on Putin and the future of Russia

Workers put up a pre-election poster featuring Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in Krasnodar, Russia

With two days to go until Sunday's presidential election, all eyes turn towards Russia. There's not much suspense about who exactly is going to win: Vladimir Putin will swagger home for a third stint in the Kremlin. But the poll takes place amid an unprecedented middle-class uprising against Putin's rule, set off by allegations of fraud after December's parliamentary elections.

All the signs are that this poll will be no cleaner. The Kremlin disqualified the only genuine opposition candidate – the leader of the liberal Yabloko party – from taking part; state TV has provided favourable blanket coverage of Putin; and opposition activists allege that officials and Russia's election commission are planning to stuff ballot boxes, as in the past. Massive anti-Putin demonstrations are planned for Monday.

With Putin showing no willingness to step down, is Russia heading inexorably towards revolution? Can we talk about a "Russian spring", or is this – as well as being the wrong metaphor for icy Moscow – simply wishful thinking? And why does Putin want to stay in power forever? Is this, as critics suggest, the only way for Russia's leader and his team to hang on to their ill-gotten billions, in a country dubbed by US diplomats a "virtual mafia state"?

• The Guardian's former Moscow correspondent Luke Harding will be online for an hour today to answer your questions. Please post them below from 12.30pm, UK time. In 2011 Luke became the first western journalist to be expelled from Moscow since the cold war. This followed a long, thuggish campaign of hounding by the FSB, the KGB's murky successor agency. Luke is happy to answer all questions – but won't deal with online activists in the pay of the Kremlin, whose activities were recently revealed by the Guardian's Miriam Elder.

David Hearst asks:

About 11 per cent was added to United Russia's vote in Moscow by stuffing ballot boxes in the Duma elections last December. Putin does not need to cheat tomorrow , because he would win if the vote was fair. So why does he need to bolster his majority?

Luke Harding replies:

There's a wonderful spoof video showing Russia's election as a 100-metre sprint. it tells you what you need to know about Sunday's "poll": Putin starts before everyone else, shoots his opponents in the leg, and then romps to victory. Vladimir Churov, the head of Russia's election commission, even brings the winning tape forward to Putin.

The December 4 Duma elections were characterised, as you say, by egregious fraud: carousel voting, doctoring of voter protocols, and ballot-box stuffing. There's no reason to think this election will be different. Local officials, regional governors, the CEC all need to demonstrate their loyalty to the boss by delivering the "right" result for Putin. This is not to say that Putin doesn't enjoy genuine support. He does, especially in the provinces, and among less educated voters. But he has lost Moscow - the scene of an unprecedented middle-class uprising - and other metros.

CeefaxTheCat asks:

How would Putin get the best out of Andrei Arshavin?

Luke Harding replies:

I did once write a profile of the mercurial Andrei Arshavin for the Guardian. But I can't claim to be an expert on Arsenal FC or football in general. I suspect, though, that not even Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin could revive his career.

bennosaurusb asks:

Do you think in recent years that the conversations Russians have shared for years over the kitchen table (or on RuNet or recently LiveJournal) are becoming public? Or do you think transgressive conversation is still kept private between friends?

Luke Harding replies:

Interesting question! When I was in Moscow as the Guardian's correspondent I would routinely cover opposition rallies. Generally, the turn-out was pretty unimpressive: about 300 people, mostly indomitable old ladies and students. Clearly since December's rigged elections middle-class Russians have woken up. But more than this there is now a vibrant conversation going on about Russia's future - via Twitter, LiveJournal and, of course, on the streets.

kokoline asks:

During the election campaign Putin has been making a lot of spending commitments which many believe are not really affordable, particulary in the area of defence. How likely do you think that it is that these commitments will be fulfilled or is he just trying to buy votes?

Luke Harding replies:

I'm generally sceptical, as I think are many Russians, about vast spending commitments during an election campaign. it's undoubtedly true that living standards in Russia have risen since 2000. But this isn't because Putin is a fiscal magician: it's because the price of oil (and gas) has risen dramatically. During the first two Putin terms there was a kind of unofficial social contract with the Russian people: an increase in prosperity in exchange for giving up your rights. But I think this contract has now more or less collapsed.

phealy asks:

What is the relationship like between Vladimir Putin and Valery Gergiev (the principal conductor of the London Symphony Orchestra)? And how do ordinary Russians feel about their most talented people (even those close to Putin) having to go abroad to ply their trade?

Luke Harding replies:

Vladimir Putin and Valery Gergiev are clearly close: Gergiev had a bonhomous exchange with Putin during a televised phone-in held by the prime minister late last year. They clearly like each other! I think, in general, ordinary Russians sympathise with their talented compatriots who seek a life elsewhere. The brain drain from Russia is now bigger than at any time since the Bolshevik revolution.

melon90 asks:

To what extent have the 2010 Wikileaks cables impacted in forming the growing 'middle class' revolution? And how large and extensive are anti-governemnt protests- are they accurately presented in media?

Luke Harding replies:

The WikiLeaks cables on Russia made damning reading. They portrayed the country as brutal and despairing kleptocracy, in which the activities of the government, organised crime, and Russia's power agencies had effectively merged. For me as a journalist they were enthralling reading. US diplomats had come to the same bleak conclusions I had. But I don't think they were much of a shock to ordinary Russians, who are well aware of the society they live in.

AlojzyVolodin asks:

During recent elections there was numerous and well documented evidence of ballot stuffing and other acts of election rigging, some less subtle than others. What has been the government's response to these claims, if any, and what kind of discussion is being had about it at a grass roots level - for many, I imagine, Sunday's ballot will be much the same; bussed in supporters, 'miscounts', etc. What confidence do voters have that Sunday will be any different?
A second question, if you'll allow?

Russia has never had a truly representative, and sustainable, form of representational democracy. You might say that the Novgorodian veche was the closest long term experiment. The Duma was too chaotic, too uncertain a thing for Nicholas II to maintain. So it failed.
What model, then, are Russians looking to if they do oppose Putin's personal rule? Do they simply want a better kind of Putin, or do they want an entirely new, truly representative and accountable government? Are they looking to the Duma or the USSR, or perhaps even the pre-revolutionary mir?

Luke Harding replies:

Vladimir Putin has already said that the opposition is "faking" falsifications, with a view to blaming the authorities subsequently for vote-rigging. This is a wonderful piece of inverted logic. The same argument is deployed whenever a human rights worker or journalist is gunned down: that the Kremlin's enemies did it in order to discredit the Kremlin.

As to your second point, the problem is that over the past 12 year, Russian opposition groups and civil society as a whole have been squashed. So there's no consensus among the crowds on the streets on who should replace Putin.

HerrEMott asks:

Hi Luke, how much money do you think Putin has and where did he get it from?

Luke Harding replies:

I wrote a story in 2007, based on Kremlin sources, suggesting that Putin had a fortune of $40 billion. Amazingly, the Kremlin refused to comment on the story. The money-trail, of course, is notoriously hard to prove with most assets concealed via complex offshore vehicles and a series of proxies. But if you look at the Forbes list you'll find many of Putin's friends there.

larussophobe asks:

roeradu, Putin is not desperate. He is going to win reelection in a landslide, and he has already declared himself president for life before the votes are counted.

He is bristling with confidence because, your rose-colored glasses prevent you from seeing, the vast majority of Russians support him and his outrageous policies. Where are the protests against Russian aggression in Syria? Where were the protests against Russia's invasion of Georgia or its attempt to murder the President of Ukraine? As in the time of Stalin, huge numbers of Russians support evil, they are not its helpless, innocent victims as we were naively taught to believe during the cold war. That is why the KGB has been given so much power and allowed to murder patriots like Politkovskaya, Starovoitova and Estemirova with impunity.

Like others, you give Russia too much credit, and that is why Putin is able to achieve so much. That, and the craven pretenders who call themselves our leaders in the West, especially the insipid and dangerous Barack Obama, whose miserable "reset" policy with Russia is similar to Chamberlain's policy towards Hitler and has cost many Russian lives.

Luke Harding replies:

Hi Kim. When I say that Putin has "lost" Moscow I mean that he won't poll the 50 per cent needed for a first-round victory here. The dilemma for the Kremlin is whether to falsify in Moscow, tipping him over the 50 per cent barrier, which would then enrage the protesters still further. You are correct to say that there have been well-attended pro-Putin rallies. But when my colleague Miriam Elder vox-popped the crowd she found that many had been bussed in by their factory or corporation.

Navalny is a controversial figure, and I know you are not a fan. But it seems a little unfair to blame him for the opposition's failures: it is the Putin regime that still has all the power, plus a monopoly on state TV.

wandererr asks:

Hi Luke!
What's your opinioin about M. Prokhorov - is it a real opposition or, as it is said, 'Kremlin project', whose success is fully depending on the mood of out tsar?
P.S. I'm interested in your book. That's a pity that I can't purchase it in the middle of Russia :)

Luke Harding replies:

I'm afraid that anyone who is allowed to run against Vladimir Putin can't be considered genuine opposition. I haven't studied Mikhail Prokhorov's platform very closely, but what I haven't seen is any outspoken personal criticism of Putin himself. In other words, Prokhorov understands the rules of the game very well. Putin may even offer him a job in government when the election season is over.

As for my book, it's not available in Russia yet! I hope it will be.

EvgenyLegedin asks:

Hi. Luke!
What secures Putin's political power, and how strong is it actually?

Luke Harding replies:

Hi Evgeny. Nice question. I think what secured Putin's power during his first two presidential terms was the social contract I referred to earlier: that Putin was a guarantor of "stability" - that dreaded word - and of rising incomes. But this is no-longer so true. The demonstrators in Moscow and St Pete want things that people in the west take for granted: fair elections, fair courts, and equality from the law.
It will be fascinating to see what happens next! I am relatively pessimistic about the capacity these demonstrations have to bring down the Putin regime. The number of civil servants has swelled under Putin, and the power agencies are bigger and more powerful than ever.

dpalmer71 asks:

Luke, assuming Putin will win the election, what changes do you anticipate in Britain's foreign policy toward the Kremlin?

Luke Harding replies:

I think British Russian relations are in for a bumpy ride. An inquest into the death of Alexander Litvinenko will be held this autumn. The evidence gathered by Scotland Yard into his murder will be presented for the first time. I haven't seen it, but I suspect it will confirm that Litvineko's poisoning was a state-sponsored assassination, sanctioned at the highest levels of the Russian state. Putin - by this point president again, and inclined to see conspiracy in everything - won't like this much.

graz asks:

One of the things that's always struck me about Putin is his absolute desire to hold onto power. Surely he has enough soft power in terms of his wealth and connections that he need not stick to being in office. What is the underlying personal motivation for this?

Luke Harding replies:

There are a couple of theories about why Putin wants to stay in power for ever. One, is that he would actually like to quit, is tired of governing, but has become a prisoner of his own corrupt system. (In other words, he's the only person capable of guaranteeing that Russia's current ruling elite can hang on to their assets.) The second is that he enjoys power and sees himself as a kind of enlightened absolutist - carrying out a historical mission to restore Russian greatness.

I think the answer is two. Plus Putin knows that any real successor (as opposed to a fake like Medvedev) would put Putin in jail.

gwilliam asks:

I was in Moscow this week and the middle class people I was with - not a hugely representative sample of anything - were excitedly optimistic about the growth of a vocal opposition.
As they're presumably doomed to failure on Sunday - what do you think the fallout will be? Where do you see this unfocussed opposition going post-election?

Luke Harding replies:

It's a mug's game being predictive! Several distinguished analysts have pronounced Putin's regime doomed - and said he will be swept away within months, or a couple of years. I think this unlikely. But I do think the protest movement will continue and that satire directed at Putin - unthinkable a couple of years ago - will continue to blossom. I suspect that when Putin does go it won't be the result of people power. Rather of an intra-elite coup, when those behind Putin realise he is no longer in a position to guarantee their assets.

benthom99 asks:

How do you see Russia changing, if at all, before and during the 2014 winter olympic games and 2018 world cup?

Luke Harding replies:

I was in Berlin during the 2006 World Cup hosted by Germany. It was a wonderful experience and a transformative moment both for Germany itself and for British's attitudes towards German. The British tabloid press stopped churning out awful cliches about the Germans being Nazis, and portrayed them instead as fun-loving revellers.

I'm not so sure about Sochi but I hope the 2018 World Cup will have a similar effect on perceptions towards Russia. Despite what Kremlin trolls say, I love Russia and its resilient culture, have wonderful friends there, and spent four years pleasurably learning Russian.

Kovno asks:

Does David Cameron have more popular support in the UK than Vladimir Putin has in Russia?

Luke Harding replies:

It's an interesting question. I'm not sure you'll like the answer much but...it's impossible to compare the two systems. As the Duma elections in December showed, the Kremlin can't stop itself from engaging in large-scale election fraud. Elections in Russia haven't been transparent, fair, or genuinely competitive, with equal access to the media, for a very long time. So there's no real way of measuring whether Cameron or Putin would win a beauty contest.

zootie asks:

Do you think there is any support (within Russia) for a recreation of the USSR? Do you think the other states of the FSU would stand for it?

Luke Harding replies:

Vladimir Putin famously talked about the demise of the USSR as the "greatest political catastrophe of the twentieth century." But I'm not sure that he actually wants a Soviet Union mark 2. Instead, his vision is of a big, maximal Russia, respected internationally, and enjoying "privileged interests" towards its post-Soviet neighbours. I'm not sure this is very appealling for anyone else. Even Belarus has balked at formal union with Russia. Even Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine has found relations with Moscow tougher going than he might have anticipated.

Reflexive asks:

Now that significant numbers have openly protested against Putin, do you think the fear he arguably instils has been dented? And do you think he will robustly attempt to reassert it after the election?

Luke Harding replies:

The fear you mention is real, but hard to convey to anyone who hasn't lived in Russia, or under a Russia-style system. And I think you are right also to say that this fear has been dented: for the first time, very large numbers of people have gathered to express their contempt for the regime, and for Putin personally.

What will he do next? He could offer liberal, or liberal-seeming reforms, in an attempt to appease the demonstrators. Or he could employ the same lugubrious KGB tactics as before: taking revenge on organisers and those who have mocked him. Or both. I suspect a mixture.

VincentUkraine asks:

1. Do you have any SUBSTANTIATED evidence that the December elections were rigged?
2. If not, why do you keep claiming that they were rigged?
3. I remember that the results of the exit polls were pretty close to the final results released by the election commission: how do you square this with your rigging claims?
4. Why do you sound as if you mission as a correspondent is to disseminate anti-Putin propaganda?
Thank you.

Luke Harding replies:

Hello Vincent. The evidence that December's elections were rigged is overwhelming - with well-documented evidence of carousel voting, ballot box stuffing and post-vote manipulation of election protocols. Independent observers including the Citizen Observer group suggest that the authorities inflated United Russia's results by 11 per cent. Will Sunday's elections be any different? I very much doubt it. A good source on all this is Golos, the independent election monitoring body that has faced unprecedented state harassment in the run up to the poll.
Thank you to all for a great set of questions! And apologies to anyone I missed.