2012年2月8日星期三

Wadah Khanfar: Syria between two massacres: Hama's memory endures


As Syrians find their voice to mark the 1982 massacre, their resolve to overthrow this brutal regime is clear

Demonstrators protest against Syria's Bashar al-Assad in the town of Hula near Homs, 3 February 2012
 

While Russia and China were using their veto to abort a UN security council resolution against the Syrian regime, the news of a massacre in Homs came thick and fast. In an unprecedented escalation, the Syrian regime sought to exploit the international hesitancy to have a bloody showdown with its opposition.

This came after Syrians had observed for the first time in 30 years the anniversary of the massacre carried out in Hama in February 1982. It is regarded as one of the most gruesome events in Syria's modern history. On that occasion, former president Hafiz al-Assad decimated most of the city of Hama with aerial bombings and tanks. About 30,000 inhabitants perished, while a similar number were detained, tortured and many killed in prisons. All this occurred in the shadow of the cold war and with the cover of the Soviet Union, which was then allied to Hafiz al-Assad's regime.

Last Friday, Syrian protesters rallied under the slogan "forgive us Hama, we apologise"; a clear reference to the abject silence that has overshadowed that massacre throughout the last three decades. Although Hama was an ever-present bleeding wound in the Syrian popular conscience, and a humiliating disgrace that shook their souls, people were prohibited from remembering or mentioning it throughout the entire period of Hafiz al-Assad's rule. When his son assumed power in 2000, many were optimistic that he would at least give some consideration to the victims or reveal the fate of the thousands who were swallowed up in the prisons. But the young president chose to follow in his father's footsteps; he perpetrated another massacre in Hama and many others in Homs and other Syrian cities and towns. However, this time Bashar al-Assad has miscalculated. The Syrian revolution, which has so far sacrificed more than 7,000 dead, will not end unless the regime is overthrown.

Hafiz al-Assad's regime managed to get away with the massacre of Hama in 1982 because of the international silence dictated by the balance of forces during the cold war and a media blackout, which denied the victims a voice and prevented them from presenting the images of their calamity.

It is true that the regional and international balance of power continues to play a negative role in ending the suffering of the Syrian people. But the Syrians – as other Arab people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen – have now become the most important actors in the flow of events. This would enable them to overcome all external factors in their quest for freedom from tyranny and repression.

Regional and international hesitancy in dealing with Syria stems from two main factors. The first relates to the regional balance of power and what would happen if the regime collapsed. The second is linked to the alternatives that would replace the Ba'ath regime.

On a regional level, Syria represents the cornerstone of a strategic axis that extends from Tehran through Baghdad to Damascus and ends in Beirut. A change of regime in Syria would result in a fundamental change in this regional political configuration and alliances. In such a scenario, Iran would lose an important ally, which would affect its influence in Lebanon and Iraq. Therefore, Iran has a strong interest in defending the Syrian regime until the bitter end.

As for the possible alternatives to the regime, this is another problem confronting the main players in the region. Despite the theoretical state of "war" between Israel and Syria, the Assad regime has maintained quiet borders with Israel since 1967. Israel would face a new situation with unpredictable consequences if the Ba'ath regime collapsed, similar to the new relationship it faces with Egypt.

Analysts and politicians share a number of concerns about change in Syria; most importantly, the security of the religious minorities should the Sunnis become the majority in the new regime. What would this mean for the Alawites, Druze and Christians? Others have raised the issue of Syria's territorial integrity if a civil war erupts. Still, others highlight the organisational weakness of the Syrian opposition and question whether the Syrian National Council is capable of representing the Syrian masses and speaking on their behalf.

All these fears seem legitimate on the surface, except that they ignore an important truth, which is that the Syrian street is astute and its revolution is well aware of the dangers that surround it. They are very careful not to fall foul of these. A close examination of the popular action in recent months shows that the street has succeeded to largely neutralise the spectre of sectarianism and the militarisation of their revolution.

The Syrian popular consciousness has been able to protect the revolution from the virus of sectarianism and ethnicity by preserving its national character. From day one, the ranks of the opposition included Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni Arabs and Kurds. They all stood as one front, demanding freedom and dignity. Despite severe repression, the revolution managed to preserve its predominantly peaceful nature except in the context of defending civilians; this is a role now mainly carried out by the Free Syrian Army. This army consists of individuals and experienced officers who defected from the regime's army. They resolutely preserve the national discourse, and have not resorted to sectarian rhetoric. The Syrian street knows that the language of sectarianism will only serve the interest of the regime and it will divert the revolution from the path of democracy to that of an internal conflict that would end all hopes of living in freedom and dignity.

As for the supposed weakness and organisational ability of the Syrian opposition, there is in fact a huge capacity to organise and instil discipline. The people's co-ordinating committees administer to the people's needs efficiently. They communicate between themselves in all parts of Syria, assigning duties and dealing with logistics in a manner that is now much better than it was in the early days of the revolution. At the same time, the Syrian National Council has begun to organise its ranks abroad, agreeing on a political discourse that is more coherent and co-ordinated. True, the Syrian opposition is less well organised than their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen because of the extreme brutality of the Syrian regime, but an acceptable measure of maturity and commitment has been achieved. The street, with its civil and political forces, is able to guide the process of transition to democracy with no less proficiency than the other peoples in the region who have already got rid of their regimes.

The demonstrations that Syria witnessed last Friday ("forgive us Hama, we apologise") show that the Syrian people have resolved to overthrow the regime. It is now for the international community, especially Russia and China, to ask for forgiveness from Hama, Homs, Idlib and the Syrian people. They should also make their choices, because this time the Syrian people have a voice, and it is being heard, with photos of their daily suffering being widely circulated, and memories that never die.