To begin with, excluding China, Asia’s combined GDP is roughly equivalent to that of the US, and it vastly exceeds that of China. Furthermore, Japan remains the world’s third-largest economy, while economies like India, South Korea, Indonesia, and Australia are growing rapidly.
Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s direction, Indonesia
is on the cusp of becoming a $1 trillion economy. With a population approaching
250 million, the country’s annual GDP growth has been consistently above 6%. At
this rate, Indonesia
is likely to emerge as one of the world’s top six economies by 2030.Moreover, most of these dynamic emerging economies are also robust democracies and are committed to open economic policies. Indeed, free-trade agreements (FTAs) are expanding across the region.
Australia
and New Zealand’s
FTA with South East Asia, for example, which is now in
force for all 12 signatories, creates a free-trade area embracing more than $3
trillion of regional economic activity. Australia
is also concluding an FTA with South Korea,
and is involved in similar negotiations with China,
India, and Japan.
Negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership at the 2011
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Hawaii
reflected the pursuit of such opportunities by other countries in the region.From a global perspective, Asia’s economic dynamism is impressive: Asia accounted for less than 20% of global GDP 30 years ago, whereas the US represented 30%. But, within the next five years, Asia will constitute nearly one-third of global GDP, with the US share falling to less than one-fifth.
Nonetheless, both continental and archipelagic Asia remain beset by unresolved territorial disputes over areas such as the Korean Peninsula, the East and South China Seas, the Taiwan Straits, the Thai-Cambodian border, and Burma’s restive border regions. Each of these conflicts could undermine the prosperity that the region has built so far.
Indeed, while Asia is home to all of the world’s
hopes for the twenty-first-century global economy, it is handicapped by all of
the rigidities of an almost nineteenth-century set of territorial and security
disagreements. Although some of these disputes are intrinsically internal, there
is an interest across Asia in collectively charting a
common course on some of the region’s seemingly intractable problems, lest they
spiral out of control.Moreover, Asia has been demonstrating democratic progress, as well as a strong interest in expanding its economic openness (both internally and externally). The region is also acknowledging the need for national sovereignty, whereby countries do not have to fear outside interference with domestic politics. Finally, across the region, there is a pervasive desire to avoid polarization into Chinese and American blocs. Instead, countries in the Pacific region are attempting to build the institutions and the habits of cooperation that will enable all of us to collaborate in addressing individual security challenges as they arise.
But can the dissonant values, aspirations, and interests of the US,
China, and the
rest of Asia be reconciled in the decade ahead? Or do we
face a future defined by strategic drift, ideological conflict, and
irreconcilable interests? I firmly believe that Sino-American conflict is not
inevitable, and that it would undermine the interests of all parties, as well
as their fundamental values.A step in the right direction, albeit an imperfect one, was taken with the establishment of the G20. China, India, Korea, Indonesia, and Australia, along with Japan, now sit at the same table to deliberate on global financial regulation, financial imbalances, and the global recession. So far, China has played a significant and constructive role in this forum. In fact, without China, the global economy would not have recovered as rapidly as it did from the most recent crisis.
As China seeks to take its place in the global order, it has increasingly sought to enhance its global leverage by cooperating with other emerging economies – the other “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) – in major global negotiations. The BRICS’ regular meetings and cooperation at multiple levels are likely to be a continuing feature of the international system. But, with the exclusion of the US, this does not provide a common platform to deal with shared policy challenges in Asia (or, for that matter, elsewhere).
In his recent book On China, former US
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues for the development of a Pacific
Community. In 2011, a good start at following through on this vision was
realized at the East Asia Summit in Bali, where, for the
first time, China,
the US, and the
region’s other principal players gathered around a table to deliberate their
interests. It was a historic opportunity to begin forging a common vision for Asia’s
future.The task today is to craft what future historians might call a Pax Pacifica – a peace that will ultimately be anchored in the principles of common security, and that recognizes the realities of US and Chinese power, without turning the rest of the region into collateral damage should the Sino-American relationship deteriorate.
Kevin Rudd is Australia’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
陸克文: 太平洋共治下的未來和平
堪培拉——雖然中美兩國之間的關系對於亞洲的未來至關重要，但這也並不意味著這個區域將淪為兩國獨佔的一畝三分地。“G2”的概念也永遠不會凌駕於亞洲之上。
首先，如果將中國剔除在外的話，亞洲各國的GDP總和大概與美國相當且遠遠超過中國。此外日本依然是世界第三大經濟體，而印度，韓國和澳大利亞等國的經濟規模也在飛速增長之中。
在總統蘇西洛的領導下，印尼經濟將很快達到1萬億美元的規模。這個擁有近2.5億人口的國家年均GDP增長率一直維持在6%以上。而如果這個趨勢能得以持續的話，印尼將於2030年崛起成為世界第六大經濟體。
同時，大多數充滿活力的新興經濟體都擁有健全的民主制度並實行開放性的經濟政策。事實上，自由貿易協定正在該區域廣泛推廣開來。
以澳大利亞和新西蘭兩國與東南亞國家簽訂的自貿協定為例，該協定已經得到了12國簽署並生效，催生了一個區域經濟活動超過3萬億美元規模的自由貿易區。澳大利亞同時也在與韓國商討一項自由貿易協定，同時還與中國，印度和日本展開了類似談判。此外在2011年亞太經合組織夏威夷峰會上討論的跨太平洋戰略經濟伙伴關系也反映出該區域其他國家對這類機會的渴求。
從全球層面上亞洲的經濟活力足以令人刮目想看：30年前該區域隻佔全球GDP總量的不到20%，而美國則佔到了30%。但在未來五年內，亞洲的GDP將佔世界30%，而美國則萎縮到不足1/5。
但雖然如此，亞洲無論是在大陸還是海洋上都依然被尚未解決的領土主權沖突所困擾著，其中包括朝鮮半島，中國東海和南海海域，台灣海峽，泰國柬埔寨邊界以及動蕩不安的緬甸邊境地區。而這些沖突中的任何一個都可能對長久以來建立的繁榮造成損害。
事實上，當全世界都把21世紀全球經濟的希望放在亞洲身上之時，該地域卻依然被一種19世紀式的領土和安全分歧所結下的死結束縛著動彈不得。雖然這些問題在本質上都是國家內部事務，但對某些似乎難以應對的問題展開集體對話也是符合亞洲整體利益的，也可以令其崛起上升之路不至於偏離軌道。
此外，亞洲已經展示出了自身在民主方面所取得的進步，以及擴大其（國內外）經濟開放性的強烈興趣。區域內各國也意識到了國家主權的重要性，以保証本國內部事務免遭外部干涉。最后，整個區域都希望避免在中美集團之間左右站隊，而是把所有太平洋地區國家集中起來建立一種以協作為目的的機制和習慣，並以此在各國面臨自身安全挑戰時進行集體應對。
那麼美國，中國和亞洲其他國家之間互相沖突的價值觀，野心和利益是否能在未來十年之內達成一致？或者我們是否將要面對一個各國在戰略上朝秦暮楚，意識形態上沖突不斷且無法形成共同利益的未來？我堅信中美之間的沖突並不是不可避免的，而這一沖突將損害各方的利益以及基本價值觀。
而在解決這個問題上所邁出的正確但不完美的一步就是G20集團的建立。中國、印度、韓國、印尼、澳大利亞還有日本目前都在同一張桌子旁坐下來商討全球金融監管，財政不平衡以及全球衰退問題。目前為止中國在這個論壇上扮演了一個重要且富有建設性的角色。事實上如果沒有了中國，全球經濟也不會像過去歷次危機中那樣迅速復蘇。
隨著中國試圖在全球秩序中佔據一席之地，它也不斷試圖通過在全球主要談判中與其他新興經濟體——也就是包括巴西、俄羅斯、印度，中國和南非在內另一個“金磚”五國——協作來擴大自身影響力。金磚五國在各個層次的定期會議與協作將可能成為國際系統中長期存在的一大特色。但如果沒有了美國，上述舉動也無法為亞洲的共同政策挑戰（或者其他地方的類似事物）構建一個共同平台。
在其新近出版的《關於中國》一書中，美國前國務卿基辛格呼吁要發展一個太平洋社區。在2011年的巴厘島東亞峰會上也向著這一遠景邁出了第一步，因為那時中美以及其他亞洲主要參與者們第一次在桌子前討論各自的利益。這是一個建立亞洲未來共同願景的歷史機遇。
這個任務或許會在未來的歷史學家稱為“太平洋各國治下的和平”——也是一個能最終構建在共同安全的各條原則之上，而這也有助於認識到美國和中國力量的現實，並在中美關系惡化時避免區域內的其他國家遭受到間接傷害。
陸克文 (Kevin Rudd) 是現任澳大利亞外交部長。