Indeed, fearing the popularity of Lee Teng-hui, who ran in the 1996 presidential election on a pro-independence platform, China’s People’s Liberation Army actually fired missiles close to the nearby coast of Keelung. But this saber rattling backfired. Lee won.
The presidential election on January 14 was the first of the transfers of power in China and Taiwan that will take place this year. Later this year, China’s President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will be succeeded by men chosen by the Communist Party long ago. Avoiding new tension with Taiwan appears to have been a calculated decision by China’s leaders as they begin their own – perhaps not yet fully settled – changing of the guard.
For almost two decades, Taiwan’s presidential elections have attracted global attention not only for the robustness of Taiwan’s democratic culture, but also for the perennial question of whether the winner would seek formal independence for Taiwan. This time, Tsai Ing-wen, the woman nominated by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), mounted a late charge on the Kuomintang incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou. But China did not bluster as Tsai surged in the polls.
Instead, China did all that it could do boost Ma, who has presided over a massive increase in economic ties with the mainland. For example, China provided cheap airplane tickets to roughly 400,000 of the one million Taiwanese living on the mainland to enable them to return home to vote. Given that Ma won by 800,000 votes, this tactic may not have been decisive, but it most likely played a considerable part in determining the outcome.
Paradoxically, the strong performance of James Soong Chu-yu of the People First Party, which split from the Kuomintang, helped Ma by giving voters a second alternative to him. And America’s quiet instructions to all candidates to avoid nationalist provocation undoubtedly also played a role in dampening tension with China – another factor that probably benefited Ma.
As part of China’s new “soft” approach to Taiwan, Wen emphasizes “conceding interests” to Taiwan. In Taiwan’s south, long a DPP stronghold, that approach appears to have paid off. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan has enabled farmers and fishermen in southern Taiwan to prosper by selling agricultural and fisheries products to the enormous Chinese market, and the Kuomintang received higher support in the region than in past elections.
Of course, promoting economic interaction with Taiwan is not China’s ultimate goal; unification is. China’s government appears to believe that Ma’s victory is a step in this direction.
But economic integration is one thing, and political integration quite another. After experiencing the benefits of democracy and freedom of expression, Taiwanese are unlikely to want to settle for anything less than the open society that they have today. Indeed, with increased contact between Taiwan and the mainland, ordinary Chinese could begin to envy the modern democracy that the Taiwanese people have built – and spread the idea of an open society to the Chinese mainland. Ma’s role in his second term should be to serve as just such an evangelist for democracy in China.
Well aware of this “danger,” China is implementing five policies. The first is to expand the ECFA, so that more Taiwanese companies feel its benefits. Second, and similarly, China will try to shake up the DPP’s base by further targeting the commercial interests of Taiwanese farmers and fishermen in the south. Third, China will emphasize common Chinese culture in order to reduce Taiwanese fear of unification. A fourth goal is to win over young legislators elected during this presidential election. Finally, China will seek to prevent the use of the name Taiwan and force the international use of the awkward name “Chinese Taipei.”
But the greatest issue affecting cross-strait relations is the Chinese economy itself. Signs of decline in China’s economy, which has racked up double-digit growth for decades, would affect all of its Taiwan policies. When Shanghai stocks fell by about 20% last year, Taiwanese stocks fell by a similar amount almost simultaneously – proof of how synchronized the Chinese and Taiwanese economies have become. China will not be able to get its way if the profitability of this synchronization breaks down.
So, will Taiwan become more like the mainland, or vice versa? To ask that question is to reprise a debate that was heard when Hong Kong and Macau reverted to China, but that is seldom encountered nowadays. Whether serious moves toward unification change that fact will depend on the effectiveness of China’s soft-power approach, which cannot be limited only to the attractiveness of its economy if it is actually to succeed.
Yuriko Koike is Japan’s
former Minister of Defense and National Security Adviser.
小池百合子: 中國大陸對台灣的軟實力攻勢
東京——中國大陸在最近台灣總統大選期間的所作所為顯示出該國的領導人已經在過往的失敗經歷中得到了一些教訓。他們認識到大陸可以通過貿易或者提升令台灣民眾富裕感來對選民施加影響，而不是像以往歷屆大選（特別是台獨派候選人有望勝選的時候）那樣採取威脅性策略——甚至聲稱要威脅導彈。
事實上，出於對李登輝這位極受歡迎的台獨派總統候選人的恐懼，中國人民解放軍曾於1996年台灣大選期間向基隆港附近海域發射了導彈。但這一炫耀武力的舉動卻產生了反效果，李登輝最終贏得了大選。
而1月14日的那場大選則是兩岸政權各自實施權力交接的第一幕。隨后，中國國家主席胡錦濤和總理溫家寶將被中國共產黨早已選定的接班人所取帶。防止對台出現緊張態勢看上去似乎是中國領導人早已計算好的決定，特別是他們開始自己的——或者尚未完全塵埃落定的——權力交接之時。
近20年來，台灣的總統選舉吸引了全球的注意：這一方面是源自於其生機勃勃的民主文化，另一方面則是出於一個懸而未決的問題——選舉的勝者是否將謀求台灣的正式獨立。在本次大選中，在野台灣民主進步黨所推舉出來的候選人蔡英文在選舉最后階段對執政的國民黨總統馬英九造成了極大威脅，但大陸方面卻並未對此作出過激舉動。
相反，中國不惜一切代價去支持馬英九這位在第一任期間大力增強兩岸經濟紐帶的總統。例如目前有大概100萬台灣人居住在中國大陸，而中國則向其中約40萬人提供廉價機票以便他們回鄉投票。鑒於馬英九本次以80萬票的優勢勝選，這一策略或許並非是決定性的，但卻很可能在決定選舉結果方面扮演了一個重要的角色。
而奇怪的是，從國民黨分裂出來的親民黨候選人宋楚瑜的優異表現幫助了馬英九，因為前者提供了一個馬英九之外的第二選項（因此那些不喜歡馬英九的選民也不一定非要投給蔡英文）。與此同時，美國為免激怒大陸民族主義者而對所有候選人採取的沉默態度也無疑在緩和與中國大陸的緊張態勢中發揮了作用——這也是另一個可能對馬英九有幫助的因素。
所謂中國大陸對台新的“軟性”策略的一部分，溫家寶強調要“出讓利益”給台灣。而在長期以來一直是民進黨大本營的台灣南部地區，這一策略似乎獲得了成功。大陸與台灣之間的經濟合作框架協議（簡稱ECFA）使得南部地區的農民和漁民能將自己的收獲銷往廣闊的大陸市場，而國民黨在這些地區所獲得的支持也比以往歷次大選更多。
當然，大陸的最終目標並不是推動兩岸經濟互動，而是統一。大陸當局似乎相信馬英九的當選似乎是想這一目標又邁進了一步。
但經濟整合是一回事，政治整合又是另一回事。在經歷過了民主制度以及言論自由的好處之后，台灣民眾不會接受一個比當前開放程度更低的社會。事實上，隨著兩岸接觸的日益增加，大陸普通民眾將開始羨慕台灣人所建立起來的現代民主制度——並將開放社會的理念在大陸散播開來。而馬英九在其第二任期間所扮演的角色則應當是一個像大陸傳播民主的傳道者。
而大陸方面對這一“危險”也有充分認識，並採取了五項應對政策。首先是進一步擴大ECFA的范圍，使得更多台灣企業能從中受益。與之類似的第二項則是繼續瞄准台灣南部地區農民和漁民的商業利益，並以此動搖民進黨的基礎。第三則是強調共同的中國文化來緩解台灣人對統一的恐懼。第四項目標是爭取那些在本次總統選舉期間選舉出來的新立法委員的支持。最后，大陸將試圖阻止國際社會使用“台灣”字樣，並以拗口的“中華台北”取而代之。
但影響兩岸關系的最大事務其實是中國經濟本身。在經歷了數十年的兩位數增長之后，中國經濟放緩的跡象將影響其全面對台政策。當上海股市在去年下跌20%之時，台灣股市幾乎在同一時間下跌了同一幅度——也証明了兩岸經濟的同步一致性。而一旦這一同步利益紐帶出現破裂，大陸也無法繼續按自己的想法行事。
因此，台灣是否會變得更像大陸，還是反其道而行之？問這樣一個問題實際上等於重啟當年香港澳門回歸大陸時的討論，但在今天已經不多見了。是否能在統一方面實現重大進展將取決於中國軟實力政策的效力，而這一政策要取得成功的話，也不能僅僅被局限於經濟方面的吸引力。
小池百合子，曾任日本防衛大臣以及國家安全顧問