To predict how this struggle will play out, it helps to understand the region’s past. Since Islam’s founding in the seventh century, it has maintained a tradition of deep military engagement in politics and governance. Indeed, Islam’s increasing military prowess helped it to spread rapidly around the world.
The military was responsible for Islam’s implantation throughout the Middle East, as well as in Persia, Southern Europe, and the Indian sub-continent. And once a Muslim state was established in newly conquered lands, the military became integral to its governance.
The military’s incorporation into the state was most prominent in the Ottoman Empire, whose rulers created a new type of military force that drew its manpower mostly from Islamic-ruled parts of Europe. These Janissaries (Christian boys conscripted to serve in Ottoman infantry units) were either recruited from Europe or abducted from countries under Ottoman control.
Janissaries were not allowed to marry or to own property, which prevented them from developing loyalties outside of the imperial court. But, after these restrictions were removed in the sixteenth century, and up until their extermination in the nineteenth century, the Janissaries became extremely powerful in Istanbul (and even established their own dynasty in Egypt).
Military domination in Muslim countries survived right up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. The colonial powers that filled the vacuum left by the declining empire had their own militaries, and therefore did not need local forces to govern. But when Europeans withdrew from the Muslim world in the twentieth century, these forces rushed back in to wrest control of politics.
The military rose to power in Egypt, Pakistan, and other Arab countries in the early and mid-twentieth century. In Turkey, the military proclaimed itself the guardian of the secular Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, himself a military man.
Today, the revolutions rocking much of the Muslim world are bedeviled by Islam’s military past. In the first phase of these popular uprisings, those who had been politically and economically excluded began to demand inclusion and participation. Now a second phase is underway, marked by a serious effort to divest the old military establishment of its power. This struggle is manifesting itself in different ways in Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan.
In Egypt, the military’s takeover of the political transition after the ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak is unacceptable to Muslim and secular forces alike. Most Egyptians want the soldiers to leave politics and return to their barracks.
Essam el-Erian, whose Islamist Freedom and Justice Party recently won the most seats in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, recently said that the Muslim Brotherhood (to which the party is closely tied), does not expect the military rulers to relinquish power voluntarily. They will have to be persuaded to leave, and, if that does not work, forced out. The parliament’s first step in ultimately removing them would be to defend its authority to choose the members of a planned 100-person constitutional assembly.
Meanwhile, in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, which has strong roots in the country’s Islamic tradition, is now seeking to limit the military’s role. The armed forces, however, claim a constitutional mandate to protect the Republic’s secular traditions. And Turkey’s generals have intervened in politics several times to defend Kemalism – Atatürk’s secular ideology of modernization that pushed Islamic Turkey towards European-style liberalism.
But, of the three countries, Turkey has most successfully demilitarized its politics. The charismatic prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, having won three consecutive elections, has been able to exert his authority over the military. Controversially, he has jailed the army’s top general, İlker Başbuğ, whom Turkish prosecutors have accused – many say implausibly – of plotting to overthrow the government.
Finally, Pakistan’s military, which has governed the country for half of its 64-year history, is fighting hard to retain influence over policymaking. Humbled by its inability to control United States military operations, including the one that killed Osama bin Laden, the army is struggling to play a hand in the country’s evolving relations with India and the US. Nevertheless, wary of provoking widespread hostility, military leaders have indicated recently that they have no intention of intervening in politics.
Since the Arab Spring began, four long-established regimes have been removed, while others are under increasing pressure, giving ordinary Arabs hope that their demands will no longer be ignored, and that those who govern will be mindful of citizens’ needs. But that – the real revolution – will happen only when true representatives of citizens, rather than the military, begin to set their countries’ political course.
Shahid Javed Burki, former Finance Minister of Pakistan and
Vice President of the World Bank, is currently Chairman of the Institute of
Public Policy in Lahore.
Shahid Javed
Burki: 去軍事化的穆斯林政治
伊斯蘭堡—穆斯林政府可以將自己從本國權勢軍方手中解放出來，建立可以與自由民主國家相提並論的文官執政嗎？埃及、巴基斯坦和土耳其等國盡管情況大相徑庭，卻都面臨著這一相同緊要問題。
要預測這場斗爭結果如何，就必須理解地區的歷史。自從伊斯蘭教於700年前創立以來，就一直有著軍隊深度干預政治和治理的傳統。事實上，伊斯蘭教軍事力量的見漲是其在全世界快速傳播的助力器。
軍隊是伊斯蘭教在中東以及波斯、南歐和印度次大陸生根發芽的關鍵。隻要新征服的土地上建立起穆斯林國家，那麼軍隊就是其治國的全部。
軍隊全面干預國家的頂峰是奧斯曼帝國，其統治者建立了一支新式軍隊，軍士大多來源於伊斯蘭教控制的歐洲國家。這些蘇丹親兵（被編入奧斯曼帝國步兵的基督教雇佣軍）要麼從歐洲征召，要麼從奧斯曼帝國控制下的國家強征。
蘇丹親兵被禁止結婚，也不能擁有物業，這防止了他們對奧斯曼王朝之外的東西產生忠誠感。但是，這些限制在16世紀被取消，此后直到蘇丹親兵在19世紀被消滅之前，他們一直是伊斯坦布爾最有實力的力量（甚至在埃及建立了自己的王朝）。
穆斯林國家的軍隊主導狀況隨著19世紀早期奧斯曼帝國的滅亡而崩潰。殖民勢力填補了帝國衰落之后留下的空缺，它們擁有自己的軍隊，因此不需要當地力量來進行治理。但當20世紀歐洲人從穆斯林世界撤離時，當地力量死灰復燃，開始角逐政治控制。
20世紀中葉，軍隊在埃及、巴基斯坦和其他阿拉伯國家掌握了權力。在土耳其，軍隊將自己描述為世俗土耳其共和國的衛士，但1923年成立的土耳其共和國的建立者阿塔圖爾克本人便是一名軍人。
如今，動搖著穆斯林世界大部的革命運動正受著伊斯蘭軍隊統治史的束縛。在這些民眾起義的早期，被排擠在政治和經濟權利之外的人群開始要求包融和參與。現在，革命進入了第二階段，其標志是出現了要求舊軍事勢力不再掌權的正式努力。這場斗爭正在埃及、土耳其和巴基斯坦以各自不同的形式展開著。
在埃及，前總統穆巴拉克被罷黜后接管政治轉型的軍方不為穆斯林和世俗力量所容。大部分埃及人希望士兵遠離政治，回到軍營中去。
伊沙姆·艾利安（Essam el-Erian）的伊斯蘭自由正義黨（Islamist
Freedom and Justice Party）在最近的埃及議會選舉中贏得了最多的席位。最近，艾利安說，穆斯林兄弟會（Muslim
Brotherhood，伊斯蘭自由公正黨的緊密盟友）並不指望軍事統治者會自願放棄權力。他們需要被說服離開，如果說服不能奏效的話，就需要動用武力。議會驅逐軍事統治者的第一步是捍衛其選擇100位立憲大會參與者的權利。
與此同時，在土耳其，有著深厚伊斯蘭傳統根基的正義與發展黨（Justice and
Development Party）正在尋求限制軍隊的作用。不過，土耳其武裝力量聲稱負有憲法使命來保護土耳其共和國的世俗傳統。土耳其的將軍們多次干預政治，捍衛基馬爾主義（Kemalism，即將伊斯蘭土耳其推向歐洲式自由主義的阿塔圖爾克關於現代化的世俗意識形態）。
但是，對於這三個國家來說，土耳其在政治去軍事化方面做得最成功。信奉基督教的總理埃爾多安已經連續三次贏得連任，他可以凌駕於軍隊之上行使權力。他頗有爭議地囚禁了軍方高級將領伊爾克·巴斯布格（İlker Başbuğ）。土耳其檢方指控他意圖顛覆政府——盡管許多人認為這根本是無稽之談。
最后，巴基斯坦軍隊——治理巴基斯坦長達32年，佔巴基斯塔全部歷史的一半——正在努力地重新贏得決策影響力。由於無法控制美國軍隊的行動——包括擊斃本·拉登——巴基斯坦軍隊正在竭力試圖插手該國與印度和美國的關系。盡管如此，軍方臨到人忌憚樹敵過多，因此在最近宣布它們無意干涉政治。
自從阿拉伯之春爆發以來，已有四個根深蒂固的體制被推翻，其他體制也受到了日益增加的壓力，這給阿拉伯人民帶來了希望，他們的要求不再會被忽視，新來的治理者將考慮到他們的需求。但真正的革命隻有在人民有了真正的代表，而不是軍隊開始左右國家的政治進程時才會發生。
Shahid
Javed Burki是前巴基斯坦財政部長、世界銀行副行長。現任拉哈爾公共政策研究所主席。