Not so fast. Two issues could complicate Merkel’s re-election bid in the autumn of 2013. Domestically, her coalition partner, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), is disintegrating. Even if the FDP survives the next election (which is by no means certain), the current coalition is unlikely to retain its parliamentary majority, leaving Merkel increasingly dependent on the Social Democrats (SPD). While this needs not matter to her too much as long as she retains the chancellorship, in Sigmar Gabriel, the SPD’s leader, she faces – for the first time – an opponent whom she would underestimate at her peril.
But the real danger to Merkel is external: the European crisis. If she is unlucky, the crisis will come to a head at the start of the German election year, and all previous calculations could be moot, because, despite Germans’ frustration with Europe, the electorate would punish severely those who allowed Europe to fail.
The European Union’s economy is sliding into a severe and, in all likelihood, long-lasting recession, largely self-inflicted. While Germany is still trying to banish the specter of hyperinflation with strict eurozone austerity measures, the EU crisis countries are facing a real threat of deflation, with potentially disastrous consequences. It is only a question of time – no longer very much time – before economic destabilization gives rise to political instability.
Hungary, where democratic backsliding appears to be taking hold, provides a foretaste of a Europe in which the eurozone crisis and deflation persist. The mood in the Mediterranean EU members, as well as in Ireland, is heating up, owing not only to the tightening squeeze of austerity, but also – and perhaps more importantly – to the absence of policies that offer people hope for a better future. The explosive nature of current trends, which point to eventual re-nationalization of sovereignty from the bottom up, is greatly underestimated in Berlin.
The crisis has now reached Italy and is threatening to spread to France. With Mario Monti’s premiership, Italy has mobilized its best people, and neither Italy nor Europe will get a better government for the foreseeable future. If Monti’s administration is toppled – either in parliament or in the streets – the EU’s fourth-largest economy could come crashing down. Monti is urgently calling for help. Where is it?
Developments in France (the second-largest eurozone economy) should also not be underestimated in this presidential election year. If a majority of the French come to believe that a course of action is being imposed on them from outside – and by Germany, no less! – they will respond with traditional Gallic stubbornness.
What is at stake is less the election’s outcome than the margin between President Nicolas Sarkozy and the far-right National Front leader, Marine Le Pen – and whether she overtakes him to qualify for the second-round run-off against the Socialist candidate. While she would be unlikely to win the presidency, she could reshape and realign the French right. For that reason, a Sarkozy debacle would drastically reduce his Socialist successor’s room for maneuver on European policy, fundamentally altering France’s position in Europe.
But, while the French election’s outcome will hinge to a crucial extent on European crisis politics, Germany’s government acts as if this were none of its concern. Instead, the main – almost exclusive – topic in Berlin is the upcoming election. And the central question is not, “What needs to be done now in the interest of Europe?” Rather, it is, “How much can people in Germany be expected to accept – in particular, how much honesty?”
No one will act in a way that jeopardizes their electoral prospects, at least while there are still alternatives. So it is conceivable that Germany is not at all interested in a serious effort to resolve Europe’s crisis, because that would mean taking big risks and investing a lot of money.
The CDU-FDP coalition prefers to sugarcoat the situation by convincing themselves of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy, abetted by those in the European crisis countries unwilling to perform and reform and whose only purpose is to make the Germans pay. So far, Merkel’s coalition is like someone driving against traffic, dead certain that everyone else is going the wrong way.
Europe’s disintegration has already advanced much further than it might appear. Distrust and national egoism are spreading rapidly, devouring European solidarity and common purpose.
Institutionally, Europe has been on the right track since the last summit, but it threatens to disintegrate from the bottom up. To save the euro – which is essential, because the European project’s fate depends on the success of monetary union – Europe needs action now: in addition to indispensable austerity measures and structural reforms, there is no way to succeed without a viable economic program that will assure growth.
That won’t come cheap. If Merkel’s government believes that paying lip service to growth is enough, it is playing with fire: a euro collapse in which not only Germans would be badly burned.
Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and
vice-chancellor from 1998 to 2005, was a leader in the German Green Party for
almost 20 years.
Joschka Fischer: 玩火的總理
柏林——近來德國總理默克爾應該很高興﹔因為她所在的黨派以及她個人的支持率都不低。在中間偏右基督民主聯盟內，已經不再有對手，而且左派反對勢力也分裂成四個黨派。至少對她而言，她處理歐洲危機的方法廣為人們接受，也為大多數德國人所信任。因此，一切事都進展地十分順利，運行良好，不是嗎？
等一下! 有兩件事可能會使默克爾2013年秋天競選連任的局勢變得複雜。從國內的角度而言，她的聯合黨夥伴,
自由民主黨, 正面臨著分裂。即使自由民主黨能夠維持到下一次大選（這種情況可能不在），現在的聯合黨也不太可能保住議會的絕大多數。這使得默克爾越來越依賴社會民主黨。然而，只要她能夠連任總理，這對她來說A算不了什麼大事。在這次總理競選中，她首次面對的是社會民主黨的領導Sigmar Gabriel，是個她不可輕視的對手。
但是對默克爾來說真正的危險來自於國外---歐洲債務危機。如果她並不那麼走運，這場危機在德國大選年的伊始就發展到了危機關頭，那之前所精心制定的所有計劃都可能會毫無實際意義。這是因為儘管德國人民對歐洲感到很失望，選民都會嚴厲地去懲罰那些使歐洲垮台的人。
歐盟的經濟正在下滑。已經到達了非常不景氣的蕭條時期，這種大蕭條極有可能長久地持續下去，而經濟滑坡的主要原因是歐洲內部問題。儘管德國仍在試圖用嚴苛的歐元區貨幣緊縮政策來抑制極度通貨膨脹這一禍根，但歐盟債務危機國家正在面臨通貨緊縮這一威脅，而通貨緊縮可能會帶來災難性後果。經濟不穩定遲早會導致政局不穩定，這僅僅是一個時間問題，並不需要太多的時間。
匈牙利的民主退步似乎開始逐漸產生影響。目前歐元區經濟危機和通貨緊縮在歐洲持續發展，匈牙利的情形成了整個歐洲的預兆。包括愛爾蘭在內的一些地中海地區歐盟成員國的情緒變得越發激烈。導致這一情緒的原因不僅僅是緊縮的政策所帶來的高壓，而且更為重要的原因是缺乏能夠給人們帶來希望去憧憬更好的將來的政策。當今趨勢本質具有爆炸性，而德國人卻大大地低估了這一本質，這種趨勢會最終導致從根本上合理改革國家主權。
這場危機目前已經蔓延到了意大利而且正在威脅著法國。在意大利總理馬裡奧-蒙蒂 (Monti) 的領導下，意大利已經動員了本國最優秀的一批人才。意大利和歐洲在可預測的未來內都不會有更為出色的政府產生。如果蒙蒂的政權被推翻，無論是通過議會還是通過示威游行，歐盟的第四大經濟體都可能會面臨崩潰。蒙蒂正在極力地四處尋求幫助。幫助從何而來？
法國（歐元區第二大經濟體）的發展同樣也不應在這一總統大選年被低估。如果絕大多數的法國人相信這一連串的行動都是由德國出台從外部強加於他們，法國人一定會用高盧人固有的倔強來予以還擊。
真正使法國總統薩科奇處於危險的並不是總統選舉的結果，而是他和極右派民族陣線領導人勒龐之間的隔閡，以及是否她會代替薩科奇參加第二輪對抗社會主義代表的決定性競選。盡管她可能贏得不了總統大選，但她可以重組、重新聯盟法國右派勢力。由於這個原因，如果薩科奇的慘敗，會大幅削減其社會主義黨派繼任者在歐洲政策制定上的發言權，從而在根本上得改變了法國在歐洲的地位。
但是，盡管法國的大選結果很大程度地取決於歐洲債務危機的策略，德國政府的行為似乎表明這一結果與其毫無關系。但相反，柏林的中心話題，甚至可以說是幾乎獨家話題卻是將要到來的大選。目前的中心問題不是“需要採取什麼樣的措施來為歐洲謀利”，而是“德國人能夠接受多少，具體來說，接受多少誠信。”
沒有人願意做出危及其大選前景的行動，更何況他們至少還有其他方案可供選擇。因此，人們可以想到德國人一點也沒有興趣為解決歐洲債務危機而做出認真的努力，因為解決債務危機意味著承擔大的風險和投資大筆的錢。
基督民主聯盟和自由民主黨的聯合政黨喜歡粉飾目前的局面。他們十分清楚這是一個安格魯薩克遜陰謀。這一陰謀是那些歐債危機國中不願實施行動、不願改革的人們所慫恿出的概念，他們的目的就是想要德國人買賬。目前為止，默克爾的聯盟就像是違反交通規則開車的人一樣，非常肯定地認為其他所有人的行動都錯了。
歐洲的分裂已經比其可能表現出來的情況發展地更為嚴重。不信任和國家利己主義迅速地傳播開來，將歐洲的團結和共同目標吞噬，使之喪失殆盡
從制度上來講，自從上一次峰會以來歐洲已經走到了正確的路線上，但是仍舊存在徹底瓦解的危險。想要拯救歐元，歐洲需要立即採取行動。拯救歐元十分重要，因為歐洲計劃的命運取決於貨幣聯盟的成功與否。除了必不可少的緊縮政策和結構改革，沒有任何方式可以不採取既切實可行又保証增長的經濟項目而取得成功。
這種方式花費會很巨大。如果默克爾認為僅僅說說好聽的話去刺激增長就足夠了的話，這就相當於是在玩火，一旦這場大火燒垮整個歐洲，不僅僅是身在其中的德國人會被燒得遍體鱗傷。
Joschka
Fischer 是德國1998年-2005年的外交大臣和副總理。他曾經領導德國黨近二十年。