At a time of deepening economic and social crisis in many of the world’s rich democracies, that question is highly relevant. In Italy, for example, Prime Minister Mario Monti has the necessary and legitimate ambition to carry out comprehensive reform. He is both competent and honest, but faces a quasi-structural impediment: whereas leaders once had three years to convince voters of their policies’ benefits, they now have three hours to convince global financial markets to back their approach.
Caught between Italian legislators who, deep down, do not understand that change and markets in quest of near-immediate certainties, can Monti transcend his natural prudence and act with sufficient clarity and decisiveness?
In the United States, too, the political system is becoming increasingly dysfunctional. The political philosopher Francis Fukuyama goes so far as to say that “vetocracy” could triumph over democracy, regardless of who wins the 2012 presidential election. The separation of powers, a principle established by the US founders under the influence of philosophers such as Montesquieu, is leading today to near-paralysis.
Democracies suffer not only from their slow reaction time at moments of crisis, but also from the difficulty that they face in projecting themselves into the future and planning for the long term. On both sides of the Atlantic, political leaders know what they must do for their countries, but don’t know how to get re-elected if they actually do it. They seem to be structurally condemned to short-termism.
But it is not because democracies have a “time problem” that their era seems to some to be over. China is rightly proud to be able to project itself into the twenty-second century. But China owes that quality of long-term thinking much more to its culture than to the nature of its political system. Chinese think long term because they are Chinese, not because they are not democrats.
China’s leaders can, of course, react to events without much regard for Chinese public opinion. After all, the great majority of Chinese do not dream of democracy, even if something like a civil society is emerging, generating new interests and demands that can no longer be totally controlled or manipulated, as in the past.
But that is precisely the weakness of non-democratic regimes in a global age dominated by transparency: Who dreams of becoming a Chinese citizen, or even a citizen of Singapore? In the aftermath of North Korea’s hereditary succession, strategic thinkers rightly emphasize China’s key role in shaping the peninsula’s future. But, despite the scenes of hysteria that followed the death of the “Great Leader” Kim Jong-il, most North Koreans probably dream of joining democratic South Korea (even if many South Koreans fear that prospect).
The majority of Chinese may not want to be governed like Westerners, but it would be wrong to assume that their only ambition is to spend like Westerners. The more successful they are, the more individualistic they will become and the more they will expect the respect and consideration of those who govern them.
By contrast, if China’s economic growth slows, which is likely in the coming years, protest against corruption – a source of fragility for any regime – will escalate. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind that, ahead of the upcoming Chinese leadership transition, new occupants for only the top two posts have been chosen, and that through a process of gradual anointment by roughly a hundred people at most.
The current crisis in the advanced countries, which may very well lead to a global recession (if it is not already doing so), not only reveals the many maladies of democratic regimes, but also acts as their incubator and accelerator. And yet the crisis may turn out to have an even greater impact on non-democratic systems that seem to be more efficient, but are in reality much more fragile. We see this in mounting unrest in both Russia and China.
Contrary to what one might think, democracy is more resilient than the alternatives in the long run. This will remain true as long as democrats remain convinced of it. Non-democratic models cannot truly challenge democracy. Only the misbehavior of democrats can do that.
Dominique Moisi is the author of The Geopolitics of
Emotion.
Dominique Moisi: 困境中的民主
巴黎——民主主義在應對危機之時是否過於緩慢？民主制度在制定長期計劃時是否顯得過於稚嫩？
在許多世界上的發達民主國家都處在經濟危機和社會危機不斷加深的時期，這個問題顯得尤為關鍵。例如，意大利首相馬裡奧·蒙蒂很有必要，用合情合理的雄心壯志出台全方面的改革政策。他既有能力而且又正直可信賴，但卻面臨著擬結構性所帶來的阻礙。過去領導人擁有三年的時間使選民們信服他們出台的政策所帶來的利益，但當今的臨到人卻隻有三個小時的時間去說服全球金融市場支持他們的政策
蒙蒂被一些意大利的立法委員所阻撓，這些立法委員，從深層次的角度來說，不懂改革和市場，但卻要求短期而又立竿見影的明確結果。蒙蒂能否超越自身與生俱來的聰明才智，運用足夠的意志力和闡明事物的透徹能力去實現這一行動？
同樣，美國的政治體系也變得越來越功能失調。政治哲學家弗朗西斯日前評論道，無論誰會取得2012年總統選舉的勝利，“選民主義”都有可能會壓倒“民主主義”。三權分立，是美國建國領導人在Montesquieuz這樣的哲學家的影響下建立起來的治國綱領。但這一原則現如今將美國領向了幾近癱瘓的狀態。
民主主義不僅由於其在危機爆發時期反應時間過慢而備受打擊﹔而且當人們想要對將來制定長期的計劃時，把自身因素考慮進去的時候，所面臨的困難也使民主遭到不小的沖擊。在大西洋的兩岸的國家，政治領導人知道他們必須要為自己的國家做一些貢獻，但是當他們在實際做貢獻的時候卻不知道應該如何連任。他們似乎一直由於結構問題而被指責為短期主義。
但是，並不是因為民主主義的“時間問題”，而致使這種民主主義的時代似乎就此宣告結束。中國將自己國家的計劃已經制定到了二十二世紀，並為此感到自豪，這不無道理。但是，中國將這種長期的制定計劃能力歸功於本國的文化積澱，而並非是自身的政治制度。中國人喜歡長遠的考慮問題，原因是因為中國人自古以來就是這樣做的。這並不是因為他們是非民主人士。
當然，中國領導人可以不必太過於擔心中國大眾的觀點就可以對重大事件做出應對。畢竟，對於絕大多數的中國老百姓來說，即使文明的社會正在形成，隨之產生了新的利益和需求，並且這些利益和需求再也不能像過去那樣完全地被控制和掌控，他們也並不夢寐以求實行民主制度。
但是，在一個全球化，透明化起主導位置的時代，這恰恰是非民主政權國家的劣勢。有誰會夢想成為一名中國公民?甚至可以說成為一名新加坡公民？在朝鮮世襲連任主席的余波中，一些戰略思想家正確地強調了中國在未來朝鮮半島局勢方面的核心作用。但是，盡管人們看到了在“偉大的領袖”金正日死后，朝鮮人民表現出來的歇斯底裡，極度悲慟的畫面，但大多數的朝鮮人民可能夢想著加入民主化的韓國。（即使許多的韓國民眾很懼怕這種情況出現）
大多數的中國人民可能不想向西方人那樣去治理國家，但是假設他們唯一的目標是向西方人那樣花錢也可能是錯誤的。他們取得的成功越大，他們就會越發變得個人主義，就會期望從管理他們的人的身上得到更多的尊敬和照顧。
相比之下，一旦中國的經濟增長衰退，反對腐敗呼聲則會越來越高，腐敗在任何一個國家中都是導致衰敗的來源，而經濟衰退則可能會在未來數年間出現。事實上，不久到來的中國領導人換屆選舉中，兩個最高領導人的位置已經被選定，這一決定隻是通過大約至多100人選舉過程產生，而這一過程隻是例行公事罷了，記住這一點尤為重要。
目前，發達國家的經濟危機很有肯能會導致全球經濟衰退（即使目前為止還沒有造成全球范圍內的經濟蕭條）。這不僅僅揭露了民主制國家政權的許多弊病，同時這場危機充當了這些弊病的培養基和催化劑。然而，這場危機可能會對那些非民主制國家造成更加嚴重的沖擊。這些國家表面上看起更加有效率，而實際上卻更加脆弱。我們可以從俄羅斯和中國不斷增加的不穩定中得到這一結論。
民主主義比長遠的選擇更加具有抵抗力，這和某些人的想法背道而馳。但隻要民主人士一直堅信這種觀點，這種觀點就會維持原本的正確性。非民主模式實際上不可能真正挑戰民主主義。隻有民主人士的錯誤行為才能夠挑戰民主主義。